The Ankara Agreement: Ukraine's Solution to EU Membership
Introduction
Given the concerns raised by European Union (EU) member states regarding widespread corruption in Ukraine, and in light of the ongoing stalemate between Ukraine and Russia, a pragmatic and mutually advantageous approach for Ukraine-EU relations may involve emulating ü쾱’s association with the EU rather than pursuing immediate full EU. Rather than seek full membership, the EU and Ukraine should explore a comparable framework akin to the Ankara Agreement. Adopting such an approach could serve as a model for Ukraine's engagement with the EU, offering potential benefits for both parties across various dimensions.
The Ankara Agreement
The Ankara Agreement, officially known as the “Agreement Creating an Association Between the Republic of Türkiye and the European Economic Community,” wason September 12, 1963. It established a framework for cooperation and eventual integration between Türkiye and the European Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor to the EU.While the Ankara Agreement did not explicitly commit to granting Türkiye full EU membership, it articulated the goal of eventual accession through acomprising of a preparatory stage, a transitional stage, and a final stage. The agreement was ultimately intended to establish a customs union between Türkiye and the EU, and it laid the groundwork for ü쾱’s potential candidacy for EU membership.
The primary goal of the Ankara Agreement was to create an association between Türkiye and the EEC to promote economic integration, political cooperation, and the harmonization of laws and regulations. One of the significant components of the agreement was the establishment of a customs union. This aimed to eliminate tariffs and trade barriers between the EEC and Türkiye, fostering closer economic cooperation. The agreement eliminated customs duties and tariffs on. By doing so, it created a unified market, allowing for the seamless flow of goods without trade barriers, meaning that products manufactured in Türkiye or the EEC could circulate without facing customs restrictions or additional tariffs, promoting a more efficient allocation of resources. This had manyfor consumers and businesses in both Türkiye and the EEC. Consumers benefited from a wider variety of goods at potentially lower prices, while businesses could access larger markets and enjoy economies of scale.
Additionally, the Ankara Agreement established a Common External Tariff, meaning that Türkiyethe EEC’s tariff rates and trade policies concerning third countries. This was a significant step toward economic integration, as it ensured a uniform approach to external trade. Over the years, additional protocols were signed to update and expand the scope of the Ankara Agreement. Most notably, the Additional Protocol signed in 1970 extended the customs union to cover the free movement of workers, agricultural products, and other economic. The effect of the Ankara Agreement and Additional Protocol in 1970 on ü쾱’s GDP was significant. In 1961, ü쾱’s GDP was $7.99 billion, and in 1973 its GDPto $26 billion. Türkiye applied to join the then-EEC in 1987, received candidate status in 1999, and started theprocess in 2005. Despite initial aspirations for full EU membership, ü쾱’s path to accession faced numerous challenges and delays over the years. The EU has noted that Türkiye has not met itson issues like the fight against corruption and judicial cooperation. Additionally, issues such as human rights concerns, political differences, and Cyprus-related disputesto the slow progress.
Similar Challenges and Similar Goals
Today, one of the major issues hampering Ukraine’s prospective accession to the EU is the pervasive issue of corruption, a challenge also identified inbid for EU accession. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index, Ukraine and Türkiye have comparable rankings in. Corruption in Ukraine predates its ongoing conflict with Russia, prompting the European Commission tointensified efforts to “further strengthen the fight against corruption, in particular at high level, through proactive and efficient investigations, and a credible track record of prosecutions and convictions.” Additionally, the European Commissionthat Ukraine must take “structural reforms to remove corruption, reduce the State footprint and the persistent influence of oligarchs, strengthen private property rights and enhance labour market flexibility” to improve the functioning of its market economy. The pervasiveness of corruption in Ukraine is underscored by Transparency International’s 2016 report, indicating that between 38% to 42% of Ukrainian households reported payingfor basic public services, a disconcertingly. Thus, if the EU’s reservations regarding corruption in Ukraine impede accession, an agreement modeled on the Ankara Agreement may represent a prudent course of action for fostering mutually beneficial relations between both parties.
In addition to economic corruption, Ukraine’shas been a topic of concern in its accession negotiations with the EU. Theof reform in the judicial realm has hampered Ukraine’s ability to conform to EU judicial standards. For example, the Ukrainian Constitutional Court (UCC)the cornerstones of Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms. By undermining the reforms, the UCC’smay lead to the end of IMF lending and a cancellation of Ukraine’s visa-free travel agreement with the EU. The UCC did not explain its decision, butthat judges were concerned about how they might be affected by anti-corruption prosecutions.
If the EU opts against granting Ukraine full EU membership, citing substantial impediments such as pervasive corruption, yet desires to establish collaborative ties involving market and judicial systems, a viable approach could entail modeling an association based on the Ankara Agreement to govern their relations. This would benefit both countries while also upholding the rigorous EU standards for membership. To illustrate, a negotiated agreement akin to the Ankara Agreement could yield a significant trade agreement, facilitating the removal of trade barriers between the two entities and streamlining trade in both regions. Additionally, the EU could extend preferential access to its extensive market, potentially augmenting Ukrainian exports and fostering economic growth in both Ukraine and the EU. For example, according to the European Commission, Ukraine accounts for 10% of the world wheat market, 15% of the corn market, and 13% of the barley. With little to no tariffs or customs costs in trading these commodities with the EU, both Ukraine and the EU stand to derive substantial benefits. Thus, parallel to the Ankara Agreement, an agreement between Ukraine and the EU could encompass the harmonization of regulatory standards and trade policies, facilitating business compliance with EU regulations and bolstering competitiveness in the European market. Coordination on such matters would be conducive to fostering a more integrated and mutually advantageous relationship between Ukraine and the EU.
About the Author
Rami Alkhafaji is currently a second-year JD candidate at the American University Washington College of Law. Rami has previously completed a Bachelor of Arts degree in Global Affairs with a concentration in Global Governance at George Mason University where he graduated summa cum laude. He is interested in international law, foreign policy, and the development of emerging markets. Rami is also an active member of his school’s International Law Student Association and Transactional Negotiation Team and enjoys tennis and soccer.