Georgia's European Dream
Introduction and Overview
Located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Georgia was once considered the “” in the SouthCaucasus,And tied to that, Georgia’s primary foreign policy goal has historically centered on integration in the Euro-Atlantic community, specifically through EU and NATO membership.After rising to power in 2012, Georgia’s ruling party (the Georgian Dream) pledged to pursue a “pragmatic” relationship with Russia while continually working towards Western integration. Yet,despite these promises, Georgia has experienced significant democratic backsliding while pivoting towards Russia, and thereby hindering its chances of further Euro-Atlantic integration. This sharp departure in policy is widely attributed to Georgian Dream’s founder and informal leader, Bidzini Ivanishvili, who holds considerable business interests and. Nevertheless, thequestion of where Georgia’s true loyalties lie remains unanswered.
Georgia’s rapprochement with Russia is distressing because it has coincided with a time when Georgia’s EU ambitions have hit a snag. This assumes, however, that Georgia’s foreign policy must be either pro-Western or pro-Russian. This creates a false dichotomy and fails to explain Georgia’s seemingly contradictory actions. If we look past Ivanishvili’s personal motivations and influence, Georgian leaders’ ideology and foreign policy remain rather ambiguous, as the government pursues somewhat incompatible objectives of European integration and normalized relations with Russia. Georgia continues to convey interest in joining Euro-Atlantic alliances,,, and contributing to NATO missions overseas, as well as. However, the Georgian Dream has also strengthened ties with Western adversaries,,,, and. To assess Georgia’s positionality, it is essential to explore the potential reasoning and underlying logic of Georgian leaders’ statements and political decisions in context. Georgia’s path to EU candidacy has been marked by three critical junctures whichhelp us to explain the inconsistencies of Georgia’s foreign policy: the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the rise of the Georgian Dream party in 2012, and the 2022 invasion ofUkraine. While the return of great power politics has led many states’ economic and security policies to become further intertwined, this piece contends that the Georgian Dream’s pursuit of economic integration with competing great powers reflects a realist strategy in which Georgian leaders seek to maximize their geostrategic location and minimize vulnerabilities in state security.
2008 Russo-Georgian War
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Georgia was nearly a failed state, plagued by economic weakness and corruption. In response to rigged parliamentary elections in November 2003, opposition leaders holding red roses stormed the Georgian Parliament, leading to the resignation of Soviet-era leader Eduard Shevardnadze. The Rose Revolution was viewed favorably in the West as the first nonviolent transfer of power in the Caucasus and demonstrated Georgians’ commitment to democracy. This marked the beginning of a strained relationship between Georgia and Russia.
After several years of deteriorating relations between Georgia and Russia, tensions reached a breaking point following theApril 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, where. In August 2008, Russia invaded the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, which remain occupied to this day. This marked the first occurrence of full-scale Russian aggression against a sovereign nation since the fall of the Soviet Union,signaling that Moscow was willing and able to defend its old backyard. In the months that followed, Western leaders offered little support to Georgia, as theand the new US administration sought to ‘reset’ relations with Russia. As outlined in the following sections, the historical memory of the 2008 war is routinelyto.
Democratic Backsliding Under the Georgian Dream
Since the Rose Revolution, Georgia had been ruled by pro-Western President Mikheil Saakashvili; however,as well as his perceived role in the 2008 war severely diminished public approval of Saakashvili’s United National Movement (UNM) party.As Saakashvili neared the end of his second term, billionaire Bidzini Ivanishvili created the Georgian Dream party and formed a coalition of political parties to run against Saakashvili and the UNM. By uniting opposition groups, the Georgian Dream coalition was able to mobilize public support and win the successive 2012 parliamentary and 2013 presidential elections. Once in power, however, the Georgian Dreamthrough patronage politics, electoral fraud, and targeted prosecution of opposition leaders and journalists.
The Georgian Dream has always included European integration as a part of their party platform, as 80% of Georgians support this goal. Facing a fragmented political opposition, Georgian Dream leaders only need to appear to be working towards these goals. As such, progress towards membership has tended to be symbolic. For example,, inscribing the government’s commitment “to ensure Georgia’s full integration into the European Union and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization.” Simultaneously, amendments were included to abolish direct presidential elections, strip presidential authority, and concentrate power in the hands of the Prime Minister and Parliament.
The Georgian Dream’s actions reflect a strategic manipulation of the European integration process to stay in power. To deflect blame and distract from the stalled reform process, leaders of the ruling party accuse opposition leaders of sabotaging the country’s EU prospects. The government’s failed impeachment of President Salome Zourabichvili this fall illustrates these tactics. Since breaking with the party, Zourabichvili has expressed sharpcriticism of the Georgian Dream and stated that Georgia did not deserve EU candidate status in 2022. During her visits with EU leaders at the end of the summer, the Georgian Dream initiated impeachment proceedings against Zourabichvili,by eroding confidence among EU leaders and exacerbating domestic polarization. Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili and other members of the ruling party have asserted that granting Georgia candidate status would. Following a series of meetings with EU leaders in early October, the Prime Minister expressed confidence in EU support for Georgia’s candidacy after receiving commitments from numerous member states.
War in Ukraine
The Georgian Dream’s policies since Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have increased tension between the Georgian government and Western leaders.Georgia’s reluctance to join EU sanctions against Russia haswho believe prospective EU countries should seek alignment with EU foreign policy. Georgian Prime Minister has pushed backLike many other developing nations,The onset of the war has only exacerbated these problems.This rapid increase in trade volume has helped Georgia’s economy reboundafter a period of steep economic decline during the Covid-19 pandemic.While sanctions might deliver a modest blow to Russia, the ramifications could be devastating to Georgia.
The Georgian government’s rhetoric stirred further controversy at the May 2023 Global Security Forum,. Garibashvili was widely condemned by Georgia civil society organizations and the international community for echoing Kremlin propaganda, an accusation. It’s possible the statement was not intended to be politically charged. After all,. The discrepancy in Western responses in 2008 and 2022 remains a sore spot for Georgian leaders, who are vocal in their resentment of the ‘unfair’ and ‘hypocritical’ treatment of Georgia.
Conclusion
As the EU’s final verdict on Georgia’s candidacy draws near, Georgian Dream leaders are scrambling to restore EU leaders’ confidence. Failure to obtain candidate status could jeopardize the Georgian Dream’s reelection chances in 2024, and their proclaimed strategy of appeasement towards the Kremlin has failed to discourage Russian provocation. In late August, Kremlin’s security council Deputy Chair Dmitry Medvedev threatened theof South Ossetia and Abkhazia and recently announced plans to establish a permanent naval base in the occupied region. Russian encroachment on Georgia’s territory may help Georgia rehabilitate its image, but integration still hinges on perceived Western support. NATO has taken steps in the right direction,for Georgia,, and. Meanwhile, the EU’s deadline to decide whether to grant Georgia candidate status is fast approaching, and EU leaders are faced with an arduous decision. Granting candidate status would require the EU to overlook Georgia’s severe democratic deficiencies, while failure to do so risks strengthening Russian influence in the Caucasus.
About the Author
Alyssa Durnil is a master’s student in American University’s Comparative and Regional Studies program, specializing in Europe and Eurasia. Her research interests include transatlantic relations andsecurity and governance in post-Soviet states. She seeks to understand the dynamics of state security in the post-Soviet realm and the role of institutions in shaping domestic and regional outcomes.